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Abstract— Vehicular communication (VC) systems have the
potential to improve road safety and driving comfort. Never-
theless, securing the operation is a prerequisite for deployment.
So far, the security of VC applications has mostly drawn the
attention of research efforts, while comprehensive solutions to
protect the network operation have not been developed. In this
paper, we address this problem: we provide a scheme that
secures geographic position-based routing, which has been widely
accepted as the appropriate one for VC. Moreover, we focus
on the scheme currently chosen and evaluated in the Car2Car
Communication Consortium (C2C-CC). We integrate security
mechanisms to protect the position-based routing functionality
and services (beaconing, multi-hop forwarding, and geo-location
discovery), and enhance the network robustness. We propose
defense mechanisms, relying both on cryptographic primitives
and plausibility checks mitigating false position injection. Our
implementation and initial measurements show that the security
overhead is low and the proposed scheme deployable.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the near future, vehicles will be equipped with wireless
communication devices, allowing for vehicle-to-vehicle and
vehicle-to-infrastructure communication based on short-range
wireless technology (IEEE 802.11-like). These vehicular ad
hoc networks (VANETs) enable a new set of applications
to improve safety, traffic efficiency and driving comfort. For
example, a vehicle can warn other vehicles about traffic
accidents or bad road conditions.
The specific conditions and requirements for vehicular
communication (frequent topology changes, short connectivity
times, and the positioning system GPS) have justified the
development of a dedicated routing solution for wireless multi-
hop communication based on geographic positions [1], [2], [3].
Position-based routing (PBR) provides scalable and efficient
(unicast) forwarding in large-scale and highly volatile ad hoc
networks, in contrast to topology-based ad hoc routing. PBR is
currently considered and evaluated by the Car2Car Commu-
nication Consortium (C2C-CC).2 PBR, described in further
detail in Sec. II, basically comprises a location service that
maps a given node ID to its current position, geographic uni-
cast communication, and distribution of packets in geographic
areas. These services, in addition to single-hop broadcast,
enable road safety applications that disseminate safety infor-
mation either as ’event-driven messages’ (e.g. de-centralized
1C. Harsch and A. Festag acknowledge the support of the German Ministry
of Education and Research (BMB+F) for the project ‘NoW – Network on
Wheels’ under contract number 01AK064F.
2The C2C-CC is an industry consortium that develops a standard for
vehicular communication based on IEEE 802.11 technology. http://www.
car-to-car.org
hazard warning) or ’periodically-sent beacons’ (e.g. extended
electronic break-light, forward collision warning). PBR also
provides packet transport for vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-
to-roadside communication for non-safety applications.
It is vital to secure communication in VANETs, otherwise
the benefits of those novel networks can turn into a nightmare:
an attacker could send falsified information to other nodes, or
block others from receiving safety messages. Since periodic
safety messages are single-hop broadcasts, the focus has
been mostly on securing the application layer. For example,
the IEEE P1609.2 draft standard [4] does not consider the
protection of multi-hop routing. However, when the network
operation is not secured, an attacker could easily partition the
network and make delivery of event-driven safety messages
impossible. For example, the attacker could advertise a lot of
falsified identity/position pairs to its neighbors, thus forcing
them to believe there are many neighbors. It is highly probable
packets are lost when forwarded to non-existent nodes.
In this paper, we address the security of the network layer
operation for wireless multi-hop communication in VANETs.
We analyze vulnerabilities and potential attacks against geo-
graphic routing, and in particular the considered PBR. Based
on the analysis, we design a security scheme that protects
the PBR services, such as the exchange of nodes coordinates,
multi-hop (unicast and broadcast) communication, and the
correctness of the location service.
Previous work has presented design principles [5], [6],
attacks [7], [8], and components of a secure VANET architec-
ture [9], [5]. Only a few works consider security of geographic
routing: [10], [11], [12] focus on plausibility checks for
received location beacons, while [13] proposes a secure grid
based location service, secure broadcast authentication for
hop-by-hop protection, and a reputation system. Compared
to [13], our work targets the highly volatile, large-scale VC
environment that would make symmetric key mechanisms and
reputation systems hard to implement. Our focus is on com-
munication and networking, and is orthogonal to the location
service described in [13]. Also, our work is complementary
to [10], [11], [12], since it provides a comprehensive security
solution and it is tailored to the specific PBR protocol.
In the rest of the paper, we first explain the basics of PBR
in Sec. II. Then, the security objectives are listed in Sec. III,
with Sec. IV discussing an adversary model and attacks on
PBR. Sec. V presents the proposed scheme, Sec. VI analyzes
its properties and reports initial implementation measurements,
before we conclude.
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II. POSITION-BASED ROUTING PROTOCOL
Position-based routing provides multi-hop communication
in a wireless ad hoc network. It assumes that every node
knows its geographic position, e.g. by GPS, and maintains a
location table with ID and geographic positions of other nodes
as soft state. PBR supports geographic unicast (GeoUnicast),
topologically-scoped broadcast (TSB, flooding from source to
nodes in n-hop neighborhood), geographically-scoped broad-
cast (GeoBroadcast, packet transport from source to all nodes
in a geographic area) and geographically-scoped anycast
(same as GeoBroadcast, but to one of the nodes in the area).
Basically, PBR comprises three core components: beaconing,
a location service, and forwarding.
Beaconing: Nodes periodically broadcast short packets with
their ID and current geographic position. On reception of a
beacon, a node stores the information in its location table.
Location Service: When a node needs to know the position
of another node currently not available in its location table,
it issues a location query message with the sought node ID,
sequence number and hop limit. Neighboring nodes rebroad-
cast this message until it reaches the sought node (or the hop
limit). If the request is not a duplicate, the sought node answers
with a location reply message carrying its current position and
timestamp. On reception of the location reply, the originating
node updates its location table.
Geographic Unicast provides packet transport between two
nodes via multiple wireless hops. When a node wishes to send
a unicast packet, it first determines the destination position
(by location table look-up or the location service). Then, it
executes a greedy forwarding algorithm, sending the packet
to its neighbor with the minimum remaining distance to the
destination (most-forward-within-radius strategy [14]). The
algorithm is executed at every node along the forwarding path
until the packet reaches the destination.
Geographic Broadcast distributes data packets by flooding,
where nodes re-broadcast the packets if they are located in
the geographic area determined by the packet. Also, advanced
broadcasting algorithms ensure avoidance of the so-called
’broadcast storms’ minimize overhead.
A number of mechanisms enhance the basic forwarding
schemes: if a forwarder has more recent (up-to-date) informa-
tion in its location table about a given destination, it updates
on-the-fly the destination position and timestamp values in
the packet header. Similarly, based on received packet headers
with newer information, nodes update its location table.
PBR defines packet headers with fields for node ID, position
and timestamp for a source, sender, and destination, and
others.3 For GeoBroadcast, the header carries a destination
area instead of a destination ID. For the header fields we
distinguish between immutable and mutable fields. Immutable
fields are not altered during forwarding, whereas mutable fields
can be updated by forwarders (see the example GeoBroadcast
header in Fig. 1).
3The originator of a message is referred to as source, and the last forwarder
as sender.
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Fig. 1. Example packet type with mutable and immutable fields
III. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Since forwarding is based on position information, location
information obtained by correct nodes must correspond to
plausible node positions. That is, positions within a degree
of accuracy from the actual node positions. Plausibility of
location information, rather than actual locations, allows to
account for system volatility and realistic limitations, as it will
be explained in Sec.VI.
Location information, e.g., in the location table, is deemed
plausible with respect to the reported time, location and the
node’s own data. It is evaluated based on the received message
reporting the location, e.g., beacons or location service replies.
In both cases, authentic reporting of position information must
be ensured. Nodes are solely responsible for providing their
location information and impersonation must be impossible.
Data and control packet forwarding must be loop-free and
towards the destination or target area location.4 Having pack-
ets forwarded across the shortest path towards the destination
is not a requirement due to the high network volatility.
The system should be robust against abuse of the position-
based communication services, in particular towards resource
depletion. Abuses beyond the PBR functionality (e.g., data link
or physical layer jamming) are out of scope.
The above PBR-specific requirements can be related to
traditional security requirements. Authentication, and the re-
sultant integrity and non-repudiation of packets (e.g., beacons
and location queries and replies) can be sought as the means to
prevent impersonation and other manipulation of location in-
formation. Or, facilitate forwarding towards the destination, by
preventing alteration of this information in packets. Freshness
can be the means to verify plausibility, e.g., by preventing
replayed location information. Authorization can assist the
robustness, allowing nodes to utilize resources (e.g., initiating
geo-broadcasts) according to their assigned roles in the system.
Authenticity, non-repudiation and integrity are required for
PBR control packets and fields. It is thus straightforward
to require them for data (i.e., payloads) as well. Reliability,
however, is not a direct requirement at this stage, as commu-
nication is not two-way. In the case of broadcast or flooding,
reliability is inherent. Redundant forwarding could also assist
towards reliability for unicast. Privacy is not a requirement
4Unless the packet is cached or re-routed across an alternative route
segment, to bridge or circumvent “gaps” due to greedy forwarding.
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either, and it is largely orthogonal to our scheme. The selection
of a privacy enhancing solution could nonetheless affect the
network performance; for the case of frequent pseudonym
changes we refer to [15], [16].
IV. ATTACKS
An extensive study on different adversary models has been
presented in [5]. Here, we describe attacks relevant to position-
based routing, to guide the design of security countermeasures.
Attack trees [17] provide a standardized method to classify
attacks on a system: the root represents a general attack
further refined in the tree structure using AND and OR logical
connections. The complete attack tree analysis is out-of-scope
of this paper, but it is available in [18]. A simplified version
of the sub-tree on denial of service attacks against PBR is
shown in Fig. 2, and detail some abuses.
Fig. 2. Simplified DoS-against-PBR attack sub-tree
• False Position Advertisement: The attacker claims to be at
a different position than its actual one, e.g., by including
it in a beacon, data packet, or a location reply.
• Geographic Sybil Attack: The attacker advertises multiple
IDs and/or positions, to mislead other nodes that high
numbers of (non-existent) neighbors exist. Communica-
tion across non-existing nodes is in full control of the
attacker; e.g., forwarded packets will be lost.
• Packet Alteration: An attacker changes, in an unautho-
rized manner, the content of the header or payload of the
packet it forwards. The former can poison the location
table of subsequent forwarders.
• Packet Dropping: Attackers selected as forwarders can
simply drop packets, either all (black-hole attack) or
selectively (gray-hole attack).
• Replay: The attacker re-injects previously received pack-
ets into the network. For example, the attacker can poison
a node’s location table by replaying beacons.
• Packet Injection: Attackers transmit location queries or
geo-broadcast (or even unicast) packets at high-rates, to
consume bandwidth and computation power in large parts
of the network.
V. SECURE PBR
We design mechanisms to safeguard the functionality of
PBR, relying both on cryptographic primitives and plausibility
checks, towards achieving the stated security objectives. We
assume a public key infrastructure with a Certification Author-
ity (CA) that issues public/private key pairs and certificates to
vehicles. A certificate contains the node’s public key, attribute
list (e.g., to distinguish between RSUs, public emergency
vehicles and regular vehicles), the CA identifier, the certificate
lifetime, and the CA signature.
Each received packet is first submitted to a sequence of
plausibility checks using the packet’s time and location fields
as inputs. If at least one test fails, the packet is discarded.5
Otherwise, if all checks succeed, the packet is validated
cryptographically. First, the certificate is validated, unless it
was previously validated and cached. Then, the signature(s) on
the packet are validated and, if failed, discarded. Otherwise,
the packet is processed further. We discuss in more detail the
security mechanisms hereafter.
A. Cryptographic Protection
We use asymmetric cryptography and digital signatures for
all messages. In the case of beacons (one-hop communication)
a single signature is applied, with the source signing the
whole PBR packet. This is straightforward since there are
no intermediate nodes which change PBR header fields. In
contrast, for multi-hop communication, additional protection
is necessary for the mutable fields in the PBR headers.
An end-to-end signature by the packet’s source can only
cover the immutable fields. To enhance the protocol robust-
ness, we proposed the combination of hop-by-hop (neighbor-
to-neighbor) and end-to-end (source-to-destination) security:
we propose a scheme protecting packets with two signatures:
the source signature, calculated by the source over the im-
mutable fields, and the sender signature, generated by each
sending node over the mutable fields (Fig. 3).
On reception of a packet, a forwarding node i) verifies
both the source and sender signature, ii) updates the mutable
field values and generates a new sender signature, iii) replaces
the old signature by the new one, and iv) re-forwards the
packet. The destination node verifies both the sender and
source signatures.
This approach pertains to packets that propagate across
multiple hops, i.e., geo-unicat and geo-broadcast, as well as
location service query and response.
B. Plausibility Checks
Hereafter is a selection of plausibility checks, which extend
those presented in [10]. On reception of a packet, a node
executes the different checks in sequence, and drops the packet
if any of them fails.
5Even though signatures provide non-repudiation, we do not try to maintain
state on nodes transmitting implausible information.
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Fig. 3. Hybrid signature scheme: a packet holds a source and a sender
signature
a) Time: A timestamp is checked for being in a time
window to ensure that it is neither too old (in order to prevent
replay attacks), nor it does not lie in the future. In fact, nodes
update their location table only if the information of the PBR
header is newer. This test ensures that an attacker cannot alter
the destination position of a multi-hop packet and impose
this information to all subsequent forwarders by setting the
timestamp to a future value.
b) Acceptance Range: Assuming that communication de-
vices have a maximum transmission range ∆max, no neighbor
can be further away than ∆max.
c) Velocity: The maximum velocity of vehicles is limited
by physical laws to vmax. Therefore, a claimed position update
should be within a predicted space window, calculated around
the node’s previous position and a radius of ∆time ∗ vmax
(∆time is the time between two consecutive position updates).
C. Robustness Mechanisms
As the injection of false multi-hop floods or broad- or geo-
casts wastes resources of a large network part, we propose
rate-limiting mechanisms according to the attributes of the
sending node. If the rate of such traffic originating from a node
exceeds a protocol-specific threshold, its packets are not for-
warded any further. Digital signatures and unique identification
(source time-stamps) of the sender and the transmissions allow
this throughout the network. To exert even tighter control,
yet maintain effectiveness, we define distinct thresholds for
different types of nodes. Furthermore, the description of the
transmission (e.g., the target geographic area) can correspond
to different thresholds. For example, private vehicles can be
disallowed to initiate geo-casts beyond a given area size and
allowed to do so at the lowest rate, while RSU units or
emergency vehicles can do the same for larger areas and at
higher rates.
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Achieved Security Level
Digital signatures and certificates prevent impersonation,
modification and unauthorized (without the proper credentials)
injection of packets. Thus, an external attacker (i.e., not a
legitimate member of the network) can only replay control or
data packets. Recall that attacks such as jamming are beyond
the scope of this paper.
Message freshness is achieved due to time-stamps, and
duplicate detection at receivers. Spoofing attacks on the GPS
signal, if this is used, are out of scope; we assume that nodes
have their correct coordinates and reference time.6
A Sybil attack is prevented if private/signing keys are stored
in a tamper-resistant unit performing all the cryptographic
operations. It is thwarted, because attackers cannot share
their private keys or obtain private keys of legitimate nodes.
The location service is protected by the digital signature
scheme: an attacker cannot impersonate a sought node nor
alter the sought coordinates in the reply packet (assuming the
destination is correct node).
The combination of plausibility checks at first prevents an
attacker from relaying beacons or packets of other nodes: the
coordinates and time-stamp in the beacon will prevent this.
Either the coordinates of the replayed packet sender will be
beyond the perceived nominal range (distance), or they will
be correct but correspond to a sender that was in the given
location at some point in the past.
The only option for the attacker is to declare a false own
location, but its attack possibilities and impact are drastically
reduced by plausibility checks. At most, the attacker can
perturb its own position, perhaps adjust it with respect to the
positions of its neighbors, but only within the limits of what
is deemed plausible (according to plausible kinetic changes of
the vehicles and the communication capabilities of the nodes).
An attacker cannot create a loop, as it cannot mount a
Sybil attack. It might, under special conditions, cause a gap
avoidance (see for example [1]) even if no gap is present.
But this will only cause a mild lengthening of the end-to-end
route. Of course, a loop can formed and include only attackers,
but this would be equivalent to the first attacker in the loop
dropping the packet.
An attacker cannot misuse the plausibility checks against
correct nodes: no reputation is maintained, and, for example, a
replayed (implausible) beacon will not cause the blacklisting
of an otherwise correct node. Furthermore, packet injection
attacks have low impact on the network performance, as the
vehicles entitled for higher-volume transmissions are more
trustworthy.
B. Comparisons With Alternative Signature Schemes
Hop-by-hop (HbH) signatures are not sufficient for pro-
tecting end-to-end multi-hop traffic, since end nodes can be
impersonated. In contrast, end-to-end (E2E) signatures over
the immutable fields relieve forwarders from cryptographic
operations.7 This E2E authentication does not protect the
mutable field; an attacker could poison the location table its
neighbors. Disabling such updates for the sake of security
could impact the performance of the protocol (e.g., less
responsive to mobility and connectivity changes).
6Future positioning systems will be secured, as is the case for the upcoming
European system GALILEO.
7Authentication of the sender can be beneficial though.
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An alternative apparently stronger than our hybrid scheme
is an incremental signature scheme: the source signs the
whole packet; each forwarder copies the received mutable
fields to the end of the packet, updates its own mutable field,
and appends a signature over the resultant packet. This way,
the destination can authenticate every forwarder (and build a
larger network view), and track the changes of the mutable
fields. Yet, as the PBR operation is largely hop-by-hop (e.g.,
location of neighbors more important) and perturbation of own
location is possible, the incremental scheme does not provide
significant advantages of the hybrid one.
Tab. I presents the performed cryptographic operations
(number of signature generations G and verifications V 8) for a
source, a forwarder, and the destination. Furthermore, the total
overhead for communication over n forwarders is given. The
hybrid scheme offers a desirable trade-off between achieved
security and induced overhead.
SOURCE FORWARDER DESTINATION TOTAL
HbH G G + V V G + V + n(2G + V )
E2E G V V G + (n + 1)V
Hybrid 2G 2V + G 2V G + (n + 1)(2V + G)
Incremental G G + (nprev + 1)V G + (n + 1)V (n + 2)G +
∑n+1
k=1
kV
TABLE I
NUMBER OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS NEEDED
C. Initial Measurement Results
To assess the deployability of our security solution, we
have enhanced our existing prototype for car-to-car commu-
nication developed in the project NoW – Network on Wheels9
with the proposed security mechanisms and performed mea-
surements. The security implementation uses the OpenSSL
library, ECDSA with a key size of 160bits for nodes and
224 bits for the CA. The measurements were conducted on
a notebook with Intel Pentium M 1,6 GHZ CPU, 256 MB
RAM, and Linux operating system. Each measurement was
repeated 100 times. Signature generation for a beacon took
≈2.9 ms, processing of a signed beacon ≈7.7 ms. We regard
this initial result as sufficient, but it should (and can10 )
be optimized, especially for beacons received at a high rate
in a dense network scenario with many vehicles. We also
measured in a lab setup the end-to-end delay of a packet sent
over a 4 node multi-hop chain. For a packet with 100 bytes
payload, the end-to-end delay was ≈77.6 ms, which satisfies
the latency constraint (delay <= 100 ms) identified by [19]
under idealistic conditions.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a solution to secure a position-based
routing protocol for wireless multi-hop communication in
vehicular ad hoc networks. Our solution combines digital
8The verification operation comprises verification of the received certificate
and verification of the signature.
9http://www.network-on-wheels.de
10Optimizing the cryptographic library, using cryptographic hardware,
smaller key sizes according to their certificate lifetime, caching received
certificates, etc.
signatures/certificates, plausibility checks, and rate limitation.
Digital signatures on a hop-by-hop and end-to-end basis pro-
vide authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. Plausibility
checks reduce the impact of false positions on the routing
operation. Rate limitation reduces the effect of packet injection
on a large part of the network.
A main characteristic of the solution is its deployability
due to usage of well-established security mechanisms. The
integration in our experimental prototype for vehicular com-
munication has shown a low implementation complexity. In
a follow-up of this paper we will present a more detailed
security analysis, additional plausibility checks, and protocol
optimizations, as well as extensive experimental performance
evaluation based on our testbed.
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